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ASEAN’s Search for Neutrality in the South 
China Sea
Ralf Emmers
This article seeks to make a contribution to the existing literature on the South China 
Sea issue by focusing on the impact of regional institutions on conflict management 
and resolution as well as the limits these institutions face when seeking to de-escalate 
disputes. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has attempted 
to preserve its neutrality and unity over sovereignty disputes and has focused on 
the establishment of a conflict management mechanism with China-the Code of 
Conduct for the South China Sea. However, ASEAN’s efforts have been undermined 
by an escalation of the situation in the disputed waters and by rising China-U.S. 
competition in the region. The article concludes by discussing various scenarios 
regarding the future of ASEAN’s South China Sea policy.
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Introduction
The South China Sea is a major area of dispute between Brunei, China, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam and the issue plays a destabilizing 
role in the international relations of Asia. The debates over the Spratly and 
Paracel Islands are affected by the complexity of the overlapping claims and 
the multilateral nature of the disputes resulting from the number of claimants 
involved.1 The claimant states expect that their control of disputed features, most 
of which have little worth in themselves, may enable them to gain exclusive 
jurisdictional rights over the surrounding waters and seabed as well as their living 
and non-living resources. The question of sovereignty, therefore, remains at the 
core of the South China Sea disputes. None of the claimants are willing to make 
concessions on sovereignty, which leaves the territorial issue at an impasse.
The South China Sea question is traditionally examined through the lenses 
of international law, energy considerations, and the geopolitics of territorial 
disputes (Beckman 2013; Buszynski 2013; Buszynski and Sazlan 2007; Emmers 
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2010a; Owen and Schofield 2012; Segal 1985; Zou 1999). These themes are 
closely associated with concepts of statehood and sovereignty, the exploration 
and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources and fisheries, as well as the rise 
of China and the changing distribution of power in East and Southeast Asia. 
Circumstances pertaining to the South China Sea conflict are also examined in 
the context of domestic politics and popular nationalist sentiments. Therefore, 
the issue is predominantly framed through national perspectives and a realist 
understanding of power and interests. Among the claimants, China attracts the 
most attention, especially on the issue of whether Beijing is more likely to resolve 
its territorial disputes with others through diplomacy or through the use of force 
(Fravel 2011; Goldstein 2011; Kaplan 2011). 
This article seeks to make a contribution to the existing literature on the 
South China Sea issue by discussing the matter through a different lens. It adopts 
an institutional perceptive and focuses on the impact of regional institutions 
on conflict management and resolution as well as the limits they face when 
seeking to de-escalate disputes. The focus is on how the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), established in Bangkok in August 1967, has sought to 
peacefully manage the territorial disputes involving four of its ten members, as 
well as China and Taiwan, while seeking to preserve its diplomatic neutrality on 
the sovereignty issue. Achieving some form of neutrality has been a long-term 
objective of the Association since its adoption of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Kuala Lumpur in November 1971, and the Southeast 
Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) introduced in Bangkok in 
December 1995 (ASEAN 1971; ASEAN 1995). Neutrality is here understood to 
be a call for regional autonomy and the avoidance of partiality and divisions at 
the ASEAN level while steering clear from the legal obligations associated with 
the concept of neutralization. 
The Southeast Asian claimant states (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Vietnam) do not want to discuss their respective sovereignty claims in the 
South China Sea under the auspices of their regional body, nor does ASEAN 
as an international institution want to play such a mediating role. Instead, the 
Association seeks to preserve its neutrality on the sovereignty disputes and to 
focus on establishing a conflict management mechanism that would include 
all the ten ASEAN members plus China, first through the implementation of 
a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and 
eventually through the negotiation of a binding Code of Conduct (COC) for 
the South China Sea. In that sense, the Association has tried to set aside the 
problem of sovereign jurisdiction and to focus instead on conflict avoidance and 
management in an attempt to de-escalate the conflicts. 
In recent years ASEAN neutrality has been challenged by an escalation 
of the situation in the disputed waters and more broadly by rising China-U.S. 
competition in light of renewed Chinese assertiveness and the U.S. rebalance 
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to Asia. The South China Sea issue was more manageable in 2013 as compared 
to previous years, with the significant exception of the ongoing deterioration 
of relations between China and the Philippines. At the bilateral level, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang visited Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam in October 2013, while skipping the Philippines due 
to Manila’s decision to seek international arbitration over China’s expansive 
claims under the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). At 
the multilateral level, the decision made at the ASEAN-China Post Ministerial 
Conference, in July 2013, to start consultations on a COC was a step in the right 
direction. Still, progress is expected to be slow and remains uncertain at this 
stage. 
Overall, the possibility of ASEAN being split over the South China Sea issue 
cannot be ruled out, given the diversity of national perspectives in Southeast Asia 
and China’s deepening ties with some individual member states making them 
more inclined to endorse Beijing’s preferences. If this were to happen, it would 
undermine the foundations of ASEAN’s neutrality as well as the relevance of the 
ASEAN-led institutions in the wider Asia Pacific, such as the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defense Ministerial 
Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus).
ASEAN Diplomacy and the South China Sea  
Since the early 1990s the ASEAN members have sought to establish a code of 
conduct for the South China Sea based on the principles codified in the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and facilitated by ASEAN’s informal style 
of diplomacy (Buszynski 2003; Wiessmann 2010). Adopted in 1976 at the first 
summit of the ASEAN heads of state and government, the TAC is the central 
component of the institution’s conflict management model, as it provides its 
member states with a norm-based and informal code of conduct meant to help 
regulate regional interstate relations and avoid rather than resolve existing or 
potential disputes (ASEAN 1976). The TAC enumerates a set of international 
principles well-known in the study of international relations as they are found in 
the United Nations Charter signed in June 1945. Among others, the TAC refers 
to the following principles: non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, 
respect for the independence and sovereignty of all nations, peaceful settlement 
of disputes, and non-use of force (ASEAN 1976). The TAC also establishes the 
High Council, which is a dispute resolution mechanism that proposes techniques 
of mediation and consultation. Yet, the member states have never invoked the 
High Council in ASEAN’s 47-year history. 
In addition to the UN principles included in the TAC of 1976, ASEAN’s 
model of conflict management and avoidance has also been influenced by an 
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informal style of diplomacy. Known as the “ASEAN Way” and distinct to the 
Association, this process of interaction helps the members relate with each other 
and to reach, but also avoid, common decisions. It is defined by a series of features 
that include informality, quiet diplomacy, dialogue, self-restraint, solidarity, and 
consensus building (Haacke 2003).
ASEAN has sought, since the early 1990s, to peacefully manage the 
South China Sea issue by engaging China. The latter initially refused to take 
part due to its own attempt to frame the South China Sea as a bilateral rather 
than a multilateral issue. Beijing refused, for example, to sign the first ASEAN 
Declaration on the South China Sea adopted in Manila in July 1992 (ASEAN 
1992). China has gradually changed its position, however, and since the late 
1990s it has adopted, at least rhetorically, ASEAN’s norms and principles as well 
as its style of informal diplomacy. It has done so to strengthen its economic and 
diplomatic ties with the ASEAN nations as well as to soften its image in Southeast 
Asia. China’s openness to the Southeast Asian diplomatic style was illustrated 
by its signing of the DOC, in November 2002, and by becoming the first non-
ASEAN state to ratify the TAC, in October 2003.  
The DOC embodies ASEAN’s model of conflict management. The ten 
Southeast Asian states and China stated, in 2002, their respect for the principles 
of the UN Charter, UNCLOS, the TAC, and the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence. Taiwan was not included in the DOC negotiations as Beijing insists 
that it is part of China and therefore in no position to act as a separate claimant 
party. The parties agreed to resolve their territorial disputes by peaceful means, 
“without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations 
and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with 
universally recognized principles of international law” (ASEAN 2002). In 
addition, they pledged to practice self-restraint in activities that could escalate 
disputes, and to deepen their efforts to “build trust and confidence between 
and among them” (ASEAN 2002). The DOC formally rejected the use of force 
in the South China Sea and attempted to mitigate the sovereignty disputes 
by highlighting the importance of shared principles and the establishment of 
common norms of behavior. 
Many questions remain regarding the relevance and effectiveness of the 
2002 Declaration. Tonnesson (2003, 56) reminds us that the document “is 
simply a political statement.” For example, it cannot prevent or resolve incidents 
involving fishing rights in the South China Sea that often provoke strong 
domestic responses and raise nationalistic sentiments. Significantly, when it was 
first adopted in November 2002, the DOC was viewed as an interim accord as 
well as a first step toward further cooperation. The ASEAN member states and 
China were therefore expected to continue working on the eventual adoption of a 
binding code of conduct.
Nevertheless, little progress has been made toward the implementation of 
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the DOC as well as the eventual negotiation of a binding COC (Storey 2012). This 
is the case despite the establishment, in 2004, of the ASEAN-China Joint Working 
Group on the Implementation of the DOC that has led to various activities held 
over the years to achieve these two specific objectives (ASEAN 2004). Emanating 
from the Joint Working Group, the new Guidelines for the Implementation of the 
DOC in the South China Sea were signed by China and the ASEAN countries in 
July 2011 (ASEAN 2011). Yet, the guidelines were mostly perceived as nonspecific 
and therefore rather unhelpful with regard to the eventual implementation of 
the DOC. Furthermore, November 2012, the tenth anniversary of the signing of 
the DOC, was regarded as a provisional deadline for the completion of a code of 
conduct for the South China Sea. Instead, the parties involved failed to even start 
the negotiations for the COC by that point, as China declared that the time was 
not yet ripe to do so (Storey 2013). 
Some tentative progress was finally made in 2013. In April of that year 
Beijing proposed to organize a special meeting involving the foreign ministers 
from the ASEAN countries and China to hasten progress on the COC. Moreover, 
at the 8th meeting of the Joint Working Group for Implementation of the 
DOC, held in Bangkok in May 2013, China and the ASEAN countries agreed 
to implement the declaration and promote the 2011 Guidelines. Perhaps most 
significantly, Beijing and the ASEAN states agreed, in July 2013 in Brunei, to start 
formal consultations on a COC in September of that year. At a High-Level Forum 
held in Bangkok on August 2, 2013, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for 
dialogue and the joint development of resources in the South China Sea. The need 
to prevent a further escalation of the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea 
was expressed again at the Special ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 
Beijing and at the second ADMM-Plus meeting in Brunei, both held in August 
2013 (Straits Times 2013). The first consultations on a COC were eventually held 
at the 9th ASEAN-China Joint Working Group Meeting on the Implementation 
of the DOC, held in Suzhou in September 2013 (Thayer 2013; Economist 2013). 
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang called for peace and cooperation in the South China 
Sea at the ASEAN-China Summit held in Brunei in October 2013 (Global Times 
2013). Finally, officials from ASEAN and China met again, in March 2014, to 
discuss the South China Sea issue and consult on a COC (Economist 2014).
The signing of a legally binding code of conduct would certainly help in 
building trust and confidence among the claimants and in setting up a conflict 
management mechanism to lower the risk of conflict in the South China Sea. 
It is worth repeating, however, that Taiwan as a claimant party has not been 
included in the diplomatic process. It is also not yet clear whether China is 
serious about negotiating a binding code of conduct or is simply buying time 
to delay the discussions. In August 2013, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi 
indicated that the consultations would be based on the principles of consensus 
and non-interference by external parties. Thayer argues that Wang therefore 
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signaled China’s readiness to veto proposals it did not support and to counter “the 
influence of the Philippines (and possibly Vietnam) in shaping ASEAN’s position 
on the COC” (Thayer 2013, 4). 
Challenges to ASEAN Neutrality in the South China Sea 
Escalation of Tension  
The escalation of the South China Sea disputes in recent years has undermined 
the prospect for conflict management as well as challenged the neutrality 
of ASEAN (Bateman 2010; Buszynski 2013; Emmers 2010b). The maritime 
Southeast Asian nations are concerned over the rapidly growing asymmetry 
of naval power in the South China Sea to the advantage of China. Of great 
significance is the buildup of China’s Southern Fleet, as its geographical zone of 
operation is the semi-enclosed sea. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
has also built an underground nuclear submarine base near Sanya on Hainan 
Island, significantly increasing China’s strategic presence in the disputed waters 
(Straits Times 2008). The other claimant states are concerned that China’s rising 
naval power, especially its increased submarine capability, could one day be used 
to enforce its territorial claims through military might. The Philippines and 
Vietnam have responded by strengthening their own naval capabilities as well 
as building up the military structures on the features they separately occupy in 
the Spratlys. Vietnam has purchased six Kilo class submarines from Russia while 
the Philippines has reinforced its defence alliance with Washington through the 
holding of additional joint naval exercises. Still, their respective naval capabilities 
are no match for the PLAN and its naval power projection in the South China 
Sea. 
In addition to the naval arms buildup, there has been an increase, since 
2010, in the number of incidents involving the claimant countries in the South 
China Sea. These have included the repeated arrest of fishermen by national coast 
guards, the cutting of cables, and the harassment of survey vessels. The most 
significant incident occurred in April 2012 and involved Chinese and Philippine 
vessels in a standoff at Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (Perlez 2012). 
The shoal, located to the west of the Philippine island of Luzon, is disputed by 
both Beijing and Manila. A Philippine navy ship attempted to arrest Chinese 
fishermen after it had discovered several Chinese fishing vessels anchored at 
the shoal and allegedly involved in poaching and illegal fishing. However, two 
Chinese maritime surveillance ships intervened and interrupted the Philippine 
operation, eventually preventing the arrest from occurring. The incident at 
Scarborough Shoal led to further friction between Philippine and Chinese 
maritime vessels and eventually caused severe diplomatic and economic tension 
between Beijing and Manila that lasted for months (Economist 2012; Valencia 
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2012a). In addition to a war of words involving senior Chinese and Philippine 
officials, Beijing exerted economic pressure on Manila-short of imposing direct 
economic sanctions-by curbing the import of Philippine bananas through the 
introduction of tighter entry rules into China (West 2012).    
The Scarborough Shoal incident directly impacted the ASEAN diplomatic 
process and openly questioned ASEAN’s neutral stance on the South China 
Sea disputes. The impact was first observed at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
(AMM) held in Phnom Penh in July 2012. Acting as the ASEAN chair, Cambodia 
sought to appease Beijing by taking on board its concerns and minimizing 
the internationalization of the South China Sea issue. It should be noted that 
Cambodia is a close economic partner of China and dependent on its financial 
aid to sustain Cambodia’s economic development. For the first time in its 45-
year history, ASEAN failed to issue a joint communiqué due to differences over 
the South China Sea question (Puy 2012). The Philippines had asked for the 
Scarborough Shoal incident to be mentioned in the draft communiqué, but 
Cambodia refused to include a reference on the grounds that the sovereignty 
disputes with China are bilateral and not multilateral in nature. China does 
not want the disputes to be discussed at international forums, especially when 
they involve external parties, preferring instead to negotiate bilaterally with the 
Southeast Asian claimants. 
Indonesia undertook a round of shuttle diplomacy, in July 2012, to salvage 
the situation and restore ASEAN’s credibility. Deriving from the Indonesian 
initiative, Cambodia eventually released an ASEAN statement a week after 
the failed AMM that listed six basic principles on the South China Sea. These 
included the exercise of self-restraint and the non-use of force, an early adoption 
of a code of conduct, as well as the peaceful resolution of conflicts in accordance 
with UNCLOS. A lack of consensus among the member states prevented the 
adoption of a joint communiqué, however. Indonesia also circulated a “zero draft 
COC” during an ASEAN informal meeting held on the sidelines of the opening 
of the 67th regular session of the United Nations General Assembly, in September 
2012, in an attempt to find a regional solution to the South China Sea question 
(Ririhena 2012). 
Most recently, China blocked two Philippine vessels carrying supplies 
to a few marines stationed aboard the Sierra Madre, a rusting Philippine ship 
grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal since 1999. Located within the 200 
nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Philippines, the shoal is 
claimed both by Beijing and Manila. China blocked the supply boats in March 
2014 claiming that they were transporting building materials meant to carry out 
construction work on the shoal in breach of the 2002 DOC (Economist 2014). In 
response, the Philippines stated that the shoal is part of its continental shelf and 
is therefore “entitled to exercise sovereignty rights and jurisdiction in the area 
without the permission of other states” (cited in BBC News 2014).
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China-U.S. Competition 
Beyond an immediate escalation of tension in the disputed waters, increased 
China-U.S. competition in Asia has also complicated the peaceful management 
of the South China Sea disputes and challenged ASEAN neutrality on the issue. 
China and the United States are competing for regional influence and their rivalry 
has negatively impacted the overall climate of relations. The Southeast Asian 
states have continued to rely on their hedging strategy of not choosing between 
their immediate security guarantor (the United States) and their long-term 
economic partner (China). This strategy makes perfect sense from a Southeast 
Asian perspective, as being forced to choose would ultimately undermine 
ASEAN’s neutrality on the South China Sea and other issues.
The United States is a non-claimant party in the South China Sea conflict 
and it limits its interest to the preservation of the freedom of navigation, which 
includes the free passage of commercial shipping and warships as well as the 
conduct of military surveillance operations. It officially supports no claims in the 
area, although it has recently challenged China’s historical claims as defined by 
China’s “nine-dash line” that covers most of the South China Sea (Keck 2014). 
The testimony by Assistant Secretary Daniel Russel before the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs in February 2014 was particularly significant in this regard. 
In an apparent shift in U.S. policy on the South China Sea, he publicly stated 
that any “use of the ‘nine-dash line’ by China to claim maritime rights not based 
on claimed land features would be inconsistent with international law” (Russel 
2014). 
The United States has in recent years become concerned over the rise of the 
Chinese navy and whether Beijing might be ready to challenge the freedom of 
navigation principle in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Its concern 
was significantly raised as a result of the so-called “Impeccable incident” of 
March 2009. This involved the harassment of the ocean surveillance vessel USNS 
Impeccable by Chinese navy and civilian patrol vessels south of Hainan Island 
(Tyson 2009). The United States argued that the activities of the Impeccable 
were legitimate under the freedom of navigation principle as formulated under 
UNCLOS, while China claimed that the surveillance vessel was involved in an 
operation in its EEZ that first required its official consent. 
In addition to bilateral frictions with China over the issue, the United States 
has also raised the South China Sea disputes at multilateral forums. In July 
2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton declared at the ARF that the 
United States has a national interest in the freedom of navigation in the South 
China Sea. Her comments angered China, as they were perceived as a form of 
external interference. China had managed until 2010 to keep the South China 
Sea off the ARF agenda (Storey 2010). Yet, besides the United States, 11 other 
ARF participants mentioned the disputes in their statements at the meeting in 
July 2010, possibly having been emboldened by the U.S. position on the matter. 
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Clinton decided to again mention the South China Sea issue at the next ARF 
meeting held in Bali in July 2011. 
The increased attention given by the United States to the South China 
Sea issue needs to be placed in the wider strategic context of the Obama 
administration’s decision, in its first term in office, to refocus its diplomacy and 
military forces toward Asia, as part of a larger “pivot” or rebalancing strategy 
(see Clinton 2011). The latter has included a deepening of American military ties 
with the Philippines, the rotational deployment of 2,500 U.S. Marines in Darwin, 
Australia, and the deployment of up to four of its littoral combat ships (LCS) in 
Singapore. Still, budget cuts and domestic constraints in the United States have 
complicated the implementation of the pivot to Asia. For example, President 
Obama had to cancel his scheduled trip to attend the Asia Pacific Economic 
Forum (APEC) summit and the EAS, organized respectively in Bali and Brunei in 
October 2013, due to a U.S. federal government shutdown.
China has been critical of the U.S. rebalancing strategy in Asia. It views the 
pivot as an attempt by Washington to contain China’s rise by allocating more 
military might to the region and by strengthening U.S. bilateral alliances under 
its “hub and spoke” alliance system set up by the San Francisco conference 
of September 1951. China is especially concerned that the United States is 
interfering in the South China Sea issue which it views as bilateral disputes with 
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The Chinese Defense Ministry 
published a White Paper in April 2013 that indirectly referred to the United States 
and its pivot to Asia. The report stated that “[S]ome country has strengthened 
its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, 
and frequently makes the situation tenser” (cited in Perlez and Buckley 2013). 
Beijing views any attempt at internationalizing and legalizing the South China 
Sea disputes as a threat to its own national interests in the region.
In particular, China perceives the Philippine policy on the South China Sea 
to have been emboldened by the U.S. pivot to Asia. For example, it regarded the 
Philippine position during the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012 to have been 
influenced by the United States, especially after Washington openly criticized, 
in a press statement released in August 2012, China’s decision to upgrade the 
administrative level of Sansha City and establish a new military garrison in the 
Paracels (CNN 2012). Beijing had set up an army garrison a month before on 
Woody Island, which is located more than 200 nautical miles southeast of Hainan 
Island. In response to the press statement issued by the U.S. Department of 
State, China declared that Washington was sending wrong signals to the region 
and undermining efforts to promote peace and stability in the South China Sea. 
Beijing saw a similar connection to the U.S. pivot when the Philippines decided 
to challenge China’s jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea by filing a 
statement of claim, on January 22, 2013, before the special arbitral tribunal 
under UNCLOS, Annex VII. China quickly dismissed the Philippine challenge 
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and rejected the statement of claim on February 19, 2013 (Thayer 2013). The 
Philippines made its final submission to the UN tribunal on March 30, 2014. The 
tribunal has yet to determine whether it has jurisdiction, although Beijing has 
already decided to ignore the legal step undertaken by Manila. 
China and the United States disagree over where the South China Sea 
question should be discussed and how it should be resolved. Washington wants 
to raise the issue at international forums (the ARF, EAS, and the ADMM-Plus) 
and it seeks a solution in accordance with international law—although it has not 
itself ratified UNCLOS. China regards the U.S. position as highly problematic, 
as China favors an exclusive dialogue with ASEAN on the South China Sea and 
bilateral negotiations with the claimant parties involved rather than international 
arbitration at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, or at the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg. 
The great power rivalry has already divided the ASEAN states to some 
extent (Bateman 2012). The Philippines in particular has reacted positively to 
the U.S. pivot due to its growing concerns over China’s assertiveness in the South 
China Sea. The rebalance has provided Manila, and to a lesser extent Hanoi, with 
additional diplomatic and strategic leverage in their sovereignty disputes with 
China (Valencia 2012b). In contrast, feeling less threatened by China, Malaysia 
and Brunei have been more worried about the pivoting of U.S. military forces to 
Southeast Asia and the mistrust it has generated in China.
ASEAN Neutrality in the Coming Years
The territorial disputes over the South China Sea are likely to remain a key 
security flashpoint in Asia in the coming years. The start of consultations on a 
COC is a step in the right direction, but it is unlikely that a binding document 
will be completed between ASEAN and China anytime soon. Moreover, while 
China has repeatedly declared that it does not want to see an escalation of tension 
in the disputed waters, the rise in influence of the PLAN on the sovereignty issue 
could result in more frequent small-scale skirmishes between China and the 
other claimant states. Indeed, the PLAN is advocating a more assertive stance on 
the disputes in comparison to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Buszynski 
and Sazlan 2007). Fisheries incidents that escalate into diplomatic tension should 
also be expected to recur frequently in the years to come. The situation in the 
South China Sea is therefore unlikely to improve in the short-to-medium term. 
Significantly, ASEAN’s own disunity on the South China Sea has been 
highlighted in recent years. This has resulted from a lack of consensus among 
the members not only on how to manage the South China Sea disputes but also 
on the larger question of how to deal with a rapidly rising China. The Southeast 
Asian states have differing economic and diplomatic relationships with their 
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giant neighbor and contrasting views on its potential threat to regional peace 
and stability. In addition, some ASEAN nations have territorial claims in the 
South China Sea that overlap with China while others are not involved in the 
sovereignty disputes. These critical differences have made it much harder to 
achieve a common position and to establish a binding code of conduct acceptable 
to China as well as to all the Southeast Asian states.    
The Southeast Asian states will continue to have varying threat perceptions 
on the rise of China and what it means for the stability of the region in the coming 
years. At one end of the spectrum will be Vietnam and the Philippines which have 
vast overlapping claims with China over the South China Sea and have indicated 
their readiness to internationalize and legalize the issue. Both countries have 
repeatedly raised the South China Sea issue at international forums. Moreover, 
Hanoi passed the Sea Law of Vietnam, in June 2012, which angered Beijing as it 
reasserted the country’s sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, while 
Manila has sought international arbitration under UNCLOS. In contrast, Brunei 
and Malaysia are less likely to take an active approach and instead may be more 
reluctant to play up their disputes with China. In particular, they seem less keen 
to internationalize and legalize any disputes. 
Among the non-claimant states, Singapore has remained a neutral party 
in the sovereignty disputes and has limited its interest to the preservation of 
the freedom of navigation. Yet, the city-state will continue to closely monitor 
events in the South China Sea in light of its vital economic and strategic interests 
in the sea lanes of communication that cross the disputed areas. In the case of 
Indonesia and Thailand, Jakarta will continue to demonstrate the most active 
interest among the non-claimants in seeking to find a regional solution to the 
issue, while Bangkok’s position will arguably be more careful as it hopes to 
deepen its friendly ties with China. Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos are expected 
to remain ambivalent as non-claimant states and to hold a less active interest in 
the South China Sea. These countries will seek to expand their close economic 
and diplomatic ties with China and they will therefore have little incentive to 
internationalize the territorial issue. 
Whether ASEAN can preserve its neutrality over the South China Sea will 
partly depend on the policies adopted by China. The Southeast Asian states 
would welcome a Chinese diplomatic engagement with ASEAN that remains 
comprehensive and sustained in its approach. Regardless of the South China Sea 
disputes, China’s involvement in the ASEAN-led regional institutions has been 
effective in partially transforming its image in Southeast Asia. China has been an 
active participant in the ARF and also in the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the EAS, 
and the ADMM-Plus. Chinese engagement with Southeast Asia was illustrated, 
in October 2013, by the successful visits to the region by President Xi Jinping 
and Premier Li Keqiang as part of the APEC Summit and EAS, as well as by 
their bilateral visits to five Southeast Asian countries (Ho and Pitakdumrongkit 
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2013). As mentioned above, the Philippines was not included in their itineraries, 
however, and thus given the “cold shoulder” due to its submission to the arbitral 
tribunal. If China and ASEAN continue to broaden and strengthen their 
relationship, it may be easier for the Association to peacefully manage the South 
China Sea issue as the deepening interdependence between the parties involved 
could help in de-escalating the situation in the disputed waters. 
In contrast, a more assertive China would create more uncertainties in 
Southeast Asia over the role that Beijing wants to play in the region and further 
complicate the establishment of institutional mechanisms meant to address the 
South China Sea issue. Such an assertive policy could involve China imposing 
an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea similar 
to the zone Beijing introduced in the East China Sea in November 2012. The 
geographical area that such a zone might cover remains highly speculative at this 
point, as it could vary from being confined to an area south of Hainan Island to 
one that includes the Spratly Islands and most of the South China Sea. A Chinese 
ADIZ over the South China Sea would certainly undermine bilateral relations 
with most ASEAN members, especially the maritime states, and negatively 
impact negotiation of a COC in the long term. Overall, a more assertive Chinese 
policy would constitute an even greater challenge to ASEAN neutrality. It 
could potentially split the Association, with the continental non-claimant states 
preferring to bandwagon with China on the one hand and the maritime Southeast 
Asian states relying on their defense ties with the United States on the other.  
A middle-ground scenario is more likely, however. This would involve a 
situation where China’s dual policy of engagement and assertiveness toward 
Southeast Asia would not be mutually exclusive but instead complementary 
and mutually reinforcing. In other words, China could further engage ASEAN 
diplomatically and economically despite the persistence of its assertive policy 
toward the South China Sea. Beijing might practice such a dual strategy, 
especially if it considers that its national interests are being threatened in the 
disputed waters. Therefore, in the coming years China is likely to conduct an 
active diplomacy toward some claimant states (Malaysia and Brunei) and non-
claimants (Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar) while seeking to isolate 
other Southeast Asian nations (the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam). 
Finally, in such a middle-ground scenario, the United States and China 
would continue to compete for influence in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN countries 
would most likely stick to a hedging strategy when it comes to managing their 
relations with the two great powers. Still, the ability of ASEAN to remain 
neutral on the South China Sea and other issues could be severely undermined 
if relations between Washington and Beijing were to deteriorate significantly. 
Under such circumstances, the two great powers might force the Southeast Asian 
states to choose sides. The eventual outcome of such a worst-case scenario is 
unclear at this stage, although it should be noted that China’s influence over some 
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Southeast Asian nations is rising and as a result its ability to impose some form of 
compliance on these countries is also increasing. 
Conclusion
Events in recent years have challenged ASEAN diplomacy on the South China 
Sea issue. The regional body does not support any claims over the disputed 
waters and seeks instead to establish a conflict management mechanism through 
the negotiation of a binding code of conduct to lower the risk of conflict. Its 
neutrality has been undermined, however, by an escalation of the situation in 
the semi-enclosed sea and by rising China-U.S. competition in Asia. The more 
tension in the disputed waters and the more rivalry in great power relations, the 
greater the challenge posed to the Association. The incidents at Scarborough 
Shoal and the Second Thomas Shoal, in 2012 and 2014 respectively, have 
illustrated the deterioration of China-Philippine relations over the South China 
Sea issue. Likewise, the deepening competition between China and the United 
States has further complicated ASEAN’s efforts in conflict management and the 
preservation of its neutrality.
Despite these difficult circumstances, Brunei still managed to start a 
consultative process on a code of conduct under the umbrella of the DOC 
implementation during its ASEAN chairmanship in 2013. All the parties agreed 
in July of that year to hold consultations—rather than negotiations—on how to 
move forward on the COC process. The chairmanship of Brunei was therefore 
perceived as having provided new momentum to ASEAN diplomacy after 
the controversial Cambodian chairmanship the year before and to have re-
established, at least up to a point, its unity on the South China Sea issue. For its 
part, China seems to have moved away from its resistance to at least consult on 
the eventual negotiation of a code of conduct with the ASEAN states.
Nevertheless, China and the ASEAN members do not share similar 
perspectives on the way forward. While the Southeast Asian states would 
prefer to conclude a COC as quickly as possible, Beijing wants to see the full 
implementation of the DOC before the formal COC negotiations officially begin. 
This is precisely why the ASEAN-China meeting held in Suzhou in September 
2013 referred to a consultation on a COC within the framework of the DOC 
implementation rather than to the start of formal negotiations. China, therefore, 
supports a step-by-step approach whereby the conclusion of a COC is perceived 
as a long-term rather than an immediate objective. This significant gap in terms 
of how Beijing and the Southeast Asian capitals view future negotiations serves as 
a reminder of the long way to go before a binding code of conduct for the South 
China Sea can be achieved.
How will ASEAN neutrality with regard to the South China Sea issue be 
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affected in the coming years? The possibility of ASEAN being split over the 
South China Sea issue is real in the medium term, given the diversity of national 
perspectives across the member states, as well as China’s rising regional influence 
resulting from its expanding military and economic capabilities. This is especially 
true as the distribution of military and economic power between China and 
Southeast Asia is likely to continue to shift in Beijing’s favor in the coming years. 
If a split over the South China Sea were to happen, it would undermine ASEAN’s 
neutrality as well as the relevance of the ASEAN-centric institutions as part of 
the emerging security architecture in the Asia Pacific. Such an outcome would 
have profound repercussions for Southeast Asia and its regional institution, 
both diplomatically and economically. The member states need to take this risk 
seriously, as a regional split would severely undermine ASEAN’s role in regional 
affairs. It is therefore in ASEAN’s interest to ensure that great power rivalry is 
managed through institutional mechanisms and that ASEAN’s neutrality over the 
South China Sea is preserved. 
Notes
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 5th International Workshop on “The 
South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development,” organized by the 
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Hanoi, November 11-12, 2013. The author wishes to 
thank the Editor of the Asian Journal of Peacebuilding and the anonymous reviewer for 
their insightful comments and suggestions.
1. The various claimants call the islands and geographic features in the South China 
Sea by different names. This article acknowledges this fact and uses the English names of 
the disputed islands and features in order to maintain neutrality. It therefore refers to the 
Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, the Spratly Islands, and Woody 
Island.
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